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T H E C H A L L E N G E OF L E I S U R E 
TO T H E C U L T OF W O R K 
R . C . L I N S T R O M B E R G 
Leisure is an attitude of mind and a condition of the soul 
. . . [it] has been, and always will be, the first foundation 
of any culture. 
Josef Pieper 
In the spring of 1964, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Triple Revolution 
submitted a report to President Johnson. The conclusions reached in this 
report can be summed up as follows: the technical ability of our society to 
produce goods and services has progressed to such an extent that increas-
ing numbers of its members will find it impossible to obtain employment in 
economic production, and those who do obtain such employment will find 
their hours of labor considerably shortened. This hypothesis led the com-
mittee to include in its report the following statement. "Gaining control of 
our future requires the conscious formation of the society we wish to have. 
Cybernation at last forces us to ask the historic question(s). What is man's 
role when he is not dependent upon his own activities for the material basis 
of his l i fe?" 1 According to at least two members of the committee, our 
society is on the verge of solving the economic problem of scarcity. 2 Put 
in a different way, we have developed tremendous capacity for production of 
leisure time. 
Development of this capacity, however, is not an unmixed blessing. 
In spite of advances made in production of leisure time, we have not devel-
oped equally in ability to engage in leisure. In fact, many of the organizing 
institutions of our society are predicated upon the notion that leisure is 
inferior to produced goods.3 As a consequence, the necessity for increased 
leisure time will pose serious questions concerning the form and content of 
our future society. Many old goals will be rendered obsolete, and institu-
tions whose function it was to coordinate those goals with others that are 
still relevant must change. For example, the whip of necessity has been an 
important force for social discipline. If it disappears, a replacement must 
be found. 
Lack of social preparedness for leisure provides the backdrop against 
which the problem of leisure must be discussed today.4 Other ages dis-
cussed leisure, but the subject could be treated with detachment since only 
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a relatively few members of their society could afford leisure. In our time, 
if the Ad Hoc Committee is correct, large numbers of people will have a 
great deal of leisure time. This gives the question of leisure an urgency 
and a dimension missing under earlier conditions.5 It is the purpose of 
this paper to examine this question and some of its implications. 
THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF LEISURE 
Since our oldest traditions have indicated that the purpose of work is 
leisure, it is somewhat surprising that the question of leisure should need 
to be raised. As Aristotle phrased it, "We are unleisurely in order to have 
leisure.T t 6 Indeed, for Aristotle, leisure was the focal point of human 
existence, the point around which all other human activity revolved. It was 
man's supreme accomplishment, his mark of distinction differentiating him 
from other animals. Leisure was life itself, and man's function. As he put 
it most explicitly: 
Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seek-
ing that which is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, there-
fore, the life of nutrition and growth . . . . The function 
of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a 
rational principle. ^ 
Activity of soul is leisure, and involves application of those attributes of 
mind and spirit that create civilization. 
Closely related to the Aristotelian concept of leisure is what we would 
call contemplation, although this term connotes a passivity that narrows its 
applicability to only one side of the Greek idea. Perhaps a better distinc-
tion can be made by contrasting three kinds of human activity. The first is 
activity necessary for maintenance of the individual and the species as a 
biological form. This kind of activity involves economic output and related 
effort. The second type is that giving permanence and durability to the 
mortal individual by enabling him to comprehend and give expression to 
himself. Above all, this type of activity occurs when one develops and uses 
his faculty for speculation. The search for knowledge for its own sake is 
one such activity; expression of one's thoughts and feelings in any of the 
various art forms is another. The final type of human activity is that which 
creates and preserves institutions facilitating the first two types. Work, 
with its modern connotation, encompasses the first type of human activity. 
Leisure, at least as the Greeks understood it, involves the second and third 
types. Thus, the purpose of work is to sustain biological life; the purpose 
of leisure is to sustain spiritual, intellectual and social life. 
In our society, leisure is frequently viewed (perhaps generally viewed) 
as the handmaiden of work because it revives and refreshes one for more 
productive labor. Work has been the focal point and, while the statement 
that the purpose of life is work may cause us to cringe, the opposite s tate-
ment, that the purpose of life is leisure, strikes many of us as somehow 
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sinful. Time spent in leisure offers little measurable evidence of achieve-
ment, and in a pragmatic society the lack of evidence of achievement is 
proof of culpable failure, 
THE WORK-LEISURE PARADOX 
Throughout the ages attitudes toward leisure have been conditioned by 
scarcity. There appear to have been three stages in the history of the prob-
lem of scarcity (and, hence, in man's approach to questions of work and 
leisure). 8 The first stage was that in which it was taken for granted that 
scarcity was inevitable, and covered the period of time up to the Reforma-
tion. During this stage, work was viewed as an inescapable part of the 
human condition. It was irritating, it was petty — and man, in his search 
for human perfection (or ultimate salvation), was faced with the necessity 
of rising above it. The meaning of leisure and its proper form were major 
concerns of human inquiry, although it was taken for granted that leisure 
could be meaningful and available only for those intellectually and economi-
cally equipped for it. 
The Reformation and the Industrial Revolution set in motion forces 
giving r i se to the second stage. At first men hoped and then they came to 
believe that the problems posed by scarcity could be solved. However, this 
solution required total dedication to work. The cult of work began to 
develop, and speculation concerning leisure was relegated to the intellectual 
underground.^ Leisure came to be regarded as a sub-problem and, at least 
by implication, it was assumed that ultimate solution of the scarcity prob-
lem would create a utopia in which appropriate development of capacity to 
enjoy leisure would automatically evolve. 
The third stage is that in which the solution of the problem of scarcity 
is held to have been discovered, with only application of known techniques 
required to bring poverty and drudgery to an end. It is a transitional stage 
— lying between the work stage and a leisure stage yet to come. This is 
the stage we appear to be in currently, according to the Ad Hoc Committee. 
However, there is no surety that utopia will result, and even less assurance 
that capacity to enjoy leisure will be spontaneous. Mankind finds itself in a 
position analagous to that of an old man who, having looked forward to 
retirement throughout a lifetime of toil, suddenly finds himself apprehen-
sive as the fateful day approaches. The habits of a lifetime spent whole-
heartedly in labor do not prepare one for leisure. Suddenly a new aware-
ness of the problem of leisure emerges. 
STAGE I 
The Greeks were familiar with the kind of work necessary for sur-
vival. For them as for their successors, it was an inevitable fact of life. 
Some historians have suggested that work was scorned by the Greeks 
because it was the normal activity of slaves. This misses the essential 
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point! The Greeks saw pre-occupation with fulfillment of biological needs 
as destructive of the whole man (and of human freedom). Thus, slaves were 
held to be inferior because they could not escape work rather than because 
they worked. For example, Aristotle and Plato pitied the slave who was 
coerced by misfortune to a life of labor; they were contemptuous of those 
who labored when they might be free. Exclusive concern with survival was 
the hallmark of the "natural" slave, an individual who allowed this over-
riding concern for survival to bind him, without appreciation for leisure, to 
the work process. These were the ones considered to be only a step 
removed from the animal, and fit to engage in nothing but economic activity. 
Thus, in the Republic, economic production and distribution was left to men 
such as these, leaving leisure to the philosopher kings. 
The possession of leisure time was clearly to be in the hands of an 
elite, and it was to be an elite capable of both enjoying and using leisure. 
•Individuals incapable of such activity were to be kept occupied with labor. 
No ethical questions were involved: the question was never asked whether 
exclusion from opportunities for leisure was just. It was simply taken for 
granted that leisure was impossible for those whose attitudes were mater i -
ally oriented. Thus, leisure could not be a problem — it held only the 
promise of civilization. 
In the Middle Ages leisure came to be regarded as a kind of "silence," 
a receptivity of mind enabling man at leisure to perceive r ea l i t y . 1 0 Lei-
sure became an attitude of non-activity, of inward calm, of openness to 
everything. Thomas Aquinas held that leisure was possible only when man 
engages in contemplative activities, and that the goal of contemplation is 
wisdom. 
F i r s t run to thy house, and there withdraw thyself, take 
thy pastime, and do what thou hast in mind. . . .1:L when 
I go into my house I shall repose with [Wisdom].1 2 
Of course, to be wise was to know the ways of God, and so leisure implied 
a search for the purpose of man and for his relation to God. It also r e p r e -
sented, however, an avenue of escape from the limiting boundaries of the 
economic world of scarcity, and it provided man with a purpose and a hope 
that helped obliterate the despair engendered by the "inexorable". law of 
scarcity. Only in leisure was man free. His body might be constrained to 
toil, but in leisure his mind and his soul would be unfettered and capable of 
infinite flight. 
Since participation in leisure involved search for wisdom, it seems 
clear that leisure in the Middle Ages existed only for the relative few. The 
emphasis upon the search for God adds a universal element to leisure that 
seems to extend its potential to the masses . Upon closer examination, how-
ever, it is found that it is in Paradise that the masses find leisure. In life, 
labor remains an inescapable part of their condition. They were condemned 
to it, and are, therefore, unfree. It was only those intellectually or spiritu-
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ally able to r i se above or escape labor 's constraints for whom "The final 
joy of man consists in the superlative activity of his supreme power, namely 
the activity of mind engaged with incomparable truth. " 1 ^ 
There was, however, no missionary zeal to work. It was viewed as 
necessary and inevitable, but no glory was found in it. Leisure was the 
proper function of man as man; those for whom it was impossible were 
viewed with pity not unmixed with contempt. The structure of society was 
geared to leisure, and institutions to facilitate its exercise abounded. 14 
STAGE II 
After the Reformation, and especially after the Industrial Revolution 
began, a new attitude developed concerning the scarcity problem. Men 
began to believe that the problem could be solved, or at least alleviated, 
that ultimately mankind could be relieved of poverty and, perhaps, even of 
the need to engage in economic l abor . I 5 It required only concentration 
upon development of technology and production methods to harness 
resources, expand their capabilities and refine their qualities. This called, 
however, for radical change in man. He had to adopt the attitude that eco-
nomic activity has dignity, is of central importance and is desirable in its 
own right. The transition period was a long one, and produced its own 
traumas, but man's attention did turn toward enlarging output — and what 
had formerly been merely a means to life became an end of life, a purpose 
for living. 
Increasingly, economic scarcity and its implications came to underlie 
intellectual inquiry. It became necessary for occupations to demonstrate 
their utility, and work began to occupy a place of special honor since its 
usefulness was obvious and demonstrable. Work was to be superior to le i -
sure, but it was understood that this meant a kind of work resulting in a 
tangible product from which future revenues could be obtained — for from 
those revenues would come the capital funds with which the machines that 
were to eliminate scarcity would be obtained. 
There is one sort of labor which adds to the value of the 
subject upon which it is bestowed: there is another which 
has no such effect. The former, as it produces a value, 
may be called productive; the latter, unproductive labor. 
In the class [unproductive] must be ranked some of the 
gravest and most important, and some of the most frivo-
lous professions: churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men 
of letters, opera-dancers, etc. 1^ 
It is clear from the list that, at least for Adam Smith, thoughts do not pro-
duce anything in themselves; hence, in the new atmosphere of utilitarian-
ism, they became respectable only when they gave r i se to a new product, a 
new technique for production, or improved the social and political frame-
work within which work was carried out. And the criterion of improvement 
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was understood to be the prospects for an increased outflow of economic 
goods. 
In the work-charged atmosphere in which the inevitability of scarcity-
was challenged this view was not unreasonable. Pure thought was frivolous. 
Since nothing "useful" emerged from the activities of man at leisure, he 
was idle. With its purpose in disrepute, leisure became an object of con-
tempt. If leisure was at all desirable, it was solely as recreation — as a 
restorative of man's productive capabilities. At this point leisure became 
"time free from work, " and the truly important part of man's existence had 
become that spent in productive labor. Life became deadly serious, and 
asceticism became a part of the catechism. Where earl ier scholars had 
glorified leisure and the search for God and man's meaning, in the seven-
teenth,. eighteenth and nineteenth centuries work was enshrined and man's 
meaning was found in it. 
Acceptance of the new attitude toward work, however, was not imme-
diately forthcoming. During the age of the artisan, a man who desired to 
indulge himself with a drink and conversation with his friends during the 
work-day could easily complete his unfinished work at a later t ime. Thus, 
in the sixteenth century, Benvenuto Cellini could say, "It so happened that I 
had been at work one morning more than three hours before daybreak, upon 
the trousseau of the bride I mentioned; then, while my shop was being 
opened and swept out, I put my cape on to go abroad and take the a i r . " 1 7 If, 
while taking the air, he should meet a colleague and spend the morning with 
him in conversation, so much to the good. The approach to work was cas -
ual, and people were accustomed to working at their own pace. Another 
quotation from the same source illustrates a different point. "M. Mattio del 
Nazara took the occasion of some feast day to invite me and my work-
people to an entertainment in a garden. " 1 8 Prior to the Reformation there 
were about 160 Saint's days each year. All of these were holidays, and 
market days were usually free as well. Not only was the attitude toward 
work casual, even by contemporary standards the amount of time spent at it 
was small. 
The machine, upon which the Industrial Revolution was based, r e -
quired a kind of synchronization of effort foreign to previously accepted 
work patterns. For the worker tied to the machine, the day's work began 
and ended at its pleasure. And its pleasure was served throughout a long 
day. Dickens illuminated the point well. 
The fairy palaces burst into illumination before pale 
morning showed the monstrous serpents of smoke trailing 
themselves over Coketown. A clattering of clogs upon the 
pavement; a rapid ringing of bells; and all the melancholy 
mad elephants, polished and oiled up for the day's monot-
ony, were at their heavy exercise again. ^ 
The day began in the early morning, ended late at night, and the machines 
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transformed work into a mindless routine that allowed no time for casual 
withdrawal from the work process. Men accustomed to the free and easy 
ways of the past were ill at ease with the new tempo of work, and, when they 
would work, were indifferent employees.2^ The widespread use of child 
labor soon created a supply of workers accustomed to the new pace, how-
ever; and work began with an intensity unknown to previous generations. By 
1866, in some industries, men were working twelve hours a day, 365 days 
a y e a r . 2 1 Long before this time, however, sixteen hours a day for women 
and children were not unusual terms of labor. And even though pressure 
arose to reduce the length of the work day, most of it arose from a desire 
to "spread" work rather than from a desire for leisure t i m e . 2 2 The drive 
to work seems to have become firmly established by the turn of the nine-
teenth-century, and contentions favorable to leisure after that time came 
from "eccentrics." 
It was in the United States that optimism concerning ultimate attain-
ment of the solution to scarcity was highest.2^ The American mood has 
traditionally been utopian — and the American utopia has had solution of the 
scarcity problem as its center. Americans have typically accepted the 
premise that their existing society is relatively unimportant, that the goal 
is development of a future society that is better — and the aspect of the bet-
ter society that distinguishes it is the abundance of economic goods it pos-
sesses . 
It was also in America that such critics of the drive to opulence as 
Thoreau developed. Walden expressed a view of the losses of materialistic 
man. Development of production capability is possible only if goods pro-
duced can be sold. Consequently, in their drive to develop the future soci-
ety, Americans were driven to require the things produced. Pressure 
toward consumption became as inexorable as those toward production. It 
was Thoreau1 s central point that his contemporaries had accepted the goal 
and its premises and conditions uncritically. They had become so intent 
upon the mechanics of producing wealth that they had forgotten not only how 
to live but why they live. It was his contention that goods and services, 
even when possessed in abundance, could never satisfy man's deepest 
needs. The pressures of economic society, under the influence of material-
istic drives, he conceived to be destructive of the individual's intrinsic and 
and personal life. The individual is pushed into mere subservience to his 
own possessions, and into a life of conformity. This occurs, according to 
Thoreau, because economic society emphasizes things rather than people, 
and because it demands work at the sacrifice of leisure; and it is in leisure 
that man realizes himself. 
Thus, the point of Thoreau's experiment at Walden was two-fold. 
First he wanted to demonstrate that man could live well with less material 
goods. Second, he intended to illustrate that when a man was able to escape 
preoccupation with economic things he could become a s elf-identified indi-
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vidual. It was a vivid expression of his opposition to the optimistic view of 
his time. 
To Thoreau, the requirements of his neighbors for "superfluous glow-
shoes and umbrellas, and empty guest rooms for empty guests'1 represented 
a search for a standard of comfort conflicting directly with the basic human 
need for leisure. But Thoreau's preachments were unavailing. The war on 
scarcity had only just begun; the momentum of the nation's drive toward 
economic growth was just commencing. And if "civilization has been 
improving our houses without improving the men who inhabit them" 2 4 the 
prevailing mood was for taking first things first — and the houses of the 
period were in for a lot of improvement. 
Thoreau was preaching an alien doctrine. The United States has had 
no indigenous bias toward leisure because its war on scarcity began early 
in its history. Leisure is not, and probably cannot be, a team sport. Most 
of the pressures accompanying economic growth militate against the kind of 
individuality required for it. If one combines overriding concern for solu-
tion of the scarcity problem with the complex set of interrelationships 
engendered by economic division of labor, the need for close and interde-
pendent cooperation becomes evident. Add to this the unique requirements 
of the machine, which refines and accentuates the rationale of the division 
of labor, and the pressures toward interdependence and conformity become 
more intense. Hence, in the United States, a society developed that was 
committed to work and to play, but was unable to comprehend leisure, and 
Thoreau was out of context. 
Both the objective and subjective institutions of this society were 
designed to implement the war on scarcity. Its dominant religion (Protes-
tantism) gave powerful impetus to the work ethic. Property was placed in 
private hands to insure maximum utilization of that property in the eco-
nomic process. Income was based upon contribution to the work process in 
order to insure that all available resources would be devoted to economic 
activity. Man was to work if he was to eat, and Smith's categorization of 
poets, ar t is ts , musicians, men of letters and so forth as unproductive labor 
was taken literally. First rank in the opinion of society was given to doers, 
not to thinkers. 
STAGE m 
One of the common complaints concerning the United States has been 
that it has no indigenous culture. If Josef Pieper is right in his contention 
that leisure is the basis of culture, 2 5 this lack is not surprising for we 
have had little genuine leisure. If Mydral and Heilbroner are correct, then 
we may be on the threshold of cultural development on a scale never expe-
rienced by any society in any previous age, simply because our society will 
have more leisure time at its disposal than was ever available before. 
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Sociologists, however, are becoming concerned with the phenomenon 
of alienation, one aspect of which is man's estrangement from himself. We 
speak of the two-sidedness of man, one side Orphic (artistic), the other side 
Promethian (technical). During the second stage, man concentrated upon 
his Promethian side, allowed himself to become simply an instrument 
through which Promethian goals could be attained, and he became non-
human. This ra ises a central human issue, namely, that a society so 
engrossed with economic development that it ignores other human goals is 
an incomplete one; members of such a society both lose and sense the loss 
of their humanity. 
If this premise is true, it is not surprising that we are becoming 
aware that in spite of rising living standards something is wrong, that life 
is not becoming more meaningful but less . We are singularly ill at ease in 
the midst of plenty. As we approach an era in which the scarcity problem 
no longer commands our undivided attention we feel more and more keenly 
a loss of purpose. As we acquire more things we begin to realize that we 
have been entrapped by them into a way and a pace of life that leaves us 
unsatisfied. We must increasingly do things for our possessions, rather 
than simply having them do things for us. The dream was that man's solu-
tion of the scarcity problem would find him intellectually ready to use his 
new wealth. We are no longer so confident. Even worse, we face the pos-
sibility that the temporarily created Promethian man may have lost his 
Orphic capabilities, in which case wealth will have little meaning. 
This forces us to ask whether both social and natural scientists of 
today may not succeed in making this possibility a reality by stressing 
aspects of man's Promethian side, and, by describing man as he behaves in 
a Promethian society, generalizing from that description to arrive at a 
statement of what man is . Using economics as an example, consider the 
theory used to describe and explain Capitalism. A basic assumption upon 
which that theory res ts is that man is strongly oriented toward material 
things. The institutions that direct and channel component parts of the 
economy rely upon the validity of this assumption. Capitalism i£ goods 
oriented, and this is the major reason for its success in dealing with the 
scarcity problem. In effect, however, by presenting the system in terms of 
its goals, the economist is saying, "If you want this kind of system, you 
must be this kind of man. " But he does not make this statement explicitly. 
That would render it necessary for his listeners to make a choice, yes to 
the man, yes to the system; no to the man, no to the system. The econo-
mist seldom indicates a possible choice and, in this sense he propagates 
and propagandizes Promethian ideals. In reality he gives the impression 
that he is saying, "This is man, now and inevitably. " And he plays his part 
in the atrophy of man's Orphic s i d e . ^ 
Stage EI is a transitional stage, and the form taken by future societies 
depends to a large extent on the way we come to grips with special prob-
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lems of this stage. Some of these problems are unique to this stage; others 
are a heritage bequeathed to us by past stages, especially by Stage n . 
First , leisure requires development of human facilities of mind and 
soul. This means that some individuals may be unfit for leisure due to bio-
logical or physiological deficiencies. 2 7 Some socially and politically feas-
ible method of separating the fit from the unfit will have to be found. At 
least one writer has raised the question of the ability of democracy to cope 
with abundant leisure time. 2 8 While it is possible to find grounds for opti-
mism on this point, the problem of abundant leisure will call forth all the 
strength and understanding our system possesses for its solution. If people 
constitutionally unfit for leisure share extensively in available leisure time 
(and in a democracy they must), the manner in which they spend that time 
becomes a matter of social concern. Unlike the death Shaw's "short-
l ivers n 2 9 died in Back to Methuselah, the death the non-leisure oriented 
might die in a leisure-oriented society would be figurative rather than lit-
eral . To allow such people to suffocate in crowded conditions and mass 
boredom would be to invite the destruction of society. Heretofore, leisure 
could be viewed as the exclusive preserve of an elite that could enjoy its 
leisure secure in the knowledge that work would discipline and occupy the 
non-elite. We may be faced with the fact that there is no long-run escape 
valve for the energies and desires of the excluded group to replace that for-
merly provided by work. 30 if such is the case, our ability to meet the 
challenge of leisure will be conditioned by our ability to reduce the number 
of people incapable of enjoying leisure. 
Also, if technological change has laid the groundwork for solution of 
the scarcity problem, it has also cast doubt upon the efficacy of the existing 
structure of our system for distributing output. If the findings of the Ad 
Hoc Committee are correct, it will no longer be socially permissible to 
equate the amount of income an individual receives with the amount of his 
productive efforts. In a society committed to solution of the scarcity prob-
lem this equation was efficient and reasonable, efficient because it insured 
that all would work, reasonable because such a society has need for and can 
provide work for all. In a society in which the scarcity problem has been 
solved, and in which the labor of individuals may no longer be required, 
both the necessity for and the moral defense of such a distribution scheme 
disappear. 
We have already recognized the validity of a change in the method of 
income distribution, at least by implication. Such supplementary techniques 
as old age security, unemployment compensation and medicare demonstrate 
understanding of deficiencies in the existing general method of income dis-
tribution. Further changes will be required in a leisure society. Already, 
formal proposals for a guaranteed minimum annual income have been 
advanced, and it is interesting to note that the tone of public and editorial 
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response to such proposals indicates a degree of acceptance in marked con-
t ras t to responses to proposals for social security in the 1930's. 
However necessary such an income distribution scheme might be, it 
will raise definite problems for a democratic society. For example, its 
implications for political control appear to be obvious. Unless the income 
an individual is to receive is accorded the same protection as free speech, 
private property and the res t of our personal rights, the threat to withhold 
or withdraw the income unless the individual behaves in specified ways 
would be a potent threat to freedom. It follows from this that a constitu-
tional amendment would be required to implement the proposal. 
Finally, extension of leisure time will undoubtedly proceed more rap-
idly than ability to engage in leisure. 3 1 Aimlessness, frustration and lack 
of individual purpose will generate social tension. As Maclver so beauti-
fully expressed it, ". . . leisure becomes a void, and from the ensuing 
rest lessness men take refuge in delusive excitations or fictitious visions, 
returning to their own earth no more. "32 The pressures and strains this 
will place upon the existing social fabric will be intense. The ability of our 
society to deal with these pressures will depend upon its ability to provide a 
sense of purpose to its members. 
It is interesting that one relatively recent development, greeted enthu-
siastically by young people and apparently renewing their sense of purpose, 
has been the Peace Corps, which enables them to retain continuity with our 
old scheme of values. It involves extension of economic progress to under-
developed countries. And, of course, living standards in those countries 
must be raised. The goal of eliminating poverty was not an idle one. Per -
haps this kind of activity, the process of equalizing opportunity and mass 
education will help. In the long run, however, a wholly different purpose 
must be found. Perhaps it will be the same as that of Stage I; the current 
excitement over the "God is dead11 movement and rising interest in philoso-
phy on the college campuses may be significant in this respect. But it may 
take a form impossible to identify at present. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the particular problems facing a society in transition is always 
that posed by lagging values. The society is changing, but the guidelines for 
human action are still those designed to facilitate attainment of previously 
dominant social goals. When a value system is consistent with contempo-
rary social needs it provides the cement that holds the society to its goals. 
But, as the goals of society change, the value system consistent with old 
goals not only acts as an impediment to attainment of new goals, but actu-
ally interferes with our ability to perceive them clearly. 
In addition, new goals frequently require social action and institutions 
diametrically opposed to those to which people are accustomed. For exam-
ple, in a society committed to solution of scarcity, unearned income (that 
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is, income received without a corresponding contribution to the work proc-
ess) was considered to be illegitimate, indeed, even sinful. Institutions 
were established which were designed to insure that such incomes were 
held to a minimum. In a leisure society, the existence of such incomes will 
be a necessity, and institutions designed to generate them will be required. 
But the old institutions and values are not unrelated to others, and it seems 
likely that it will be impossible to change one part of the old value system 
without necessitating at least a revision in other par ts . For example, to 
what extent is the productivity concept of income distribution related to p r i -
vate property, and to Capitalism as an economic system? If the income 
concept is changed, what changes will this require in the others? What kind 
of an economic system will emerge as a result of these changes, and what 
will be its relation to our political institutions? Answers to these questions 
are not readily forthcoming. But it is already apparent that reciprocity 
exists between the institutions. 
At the very least, we know that man's attitudes and reaction patterns 
concerning leisure changed once in response to requirements of the Indus-
trial Revolution. New requirements will undoubtedly evoke another change. 
The real challenge will be to our ability to speed the process, ease the 
transition and insure that the changes made are appropriate and desirable. 
But this means that social scientists are going to have to become more 
obviously aware of the changes taking place in their society, and will have 
to devote special attention to the causes and consequences of those changes. 
A good beginning might take the form of examination of existing thought to 
determine the extent of its ideological content and its dependence upon 
value-based assumptions. Their objectivity and their ability are going to 
receive a severe test. 
Bradley University 
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